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YOU’D BE OKAY IF YOU WEREN’T SO GAY:
ENDING THE SPECIAL TREATMENT OF LGBT
STUDENTS UNDER TITLE IX
DANIEL B. WEDDLE
ABSTRACT
An illogical and cruel legal fiction has taken hold in the sexual
harassment jurisprudence: Title IX, the statute specifically designed to
prohibit harassment based upon sex, does not apply to harassment based
upon sexual orientation. Although harassment based upon failure to
fulfill gender stereotypes is considered discrimination based on sex,
harassment based on sexual attraction to members of one’s own sex is
not discrimination based on sex. If you wonder how sexual attraction is
not sex but effeminate characteristics are sex, you are not alone. This
article critiques the legal fiction that leaves gays without protection
from harassment that, if directed at a heterosexual, would clearly be
prohibited under Title IX.
INTRODUCTION
Jesse Montgomery was a faggot—at least, that is what his peers
said, daily. 1 For over eleven years Jesse was tormented by his
classmates, much of the abuse inspired by his perceived sexual
orientation.2 He was called “faggott,” “fag,” “gay,” “Jessica,” “girl,”
“princess,” “fairy,” “homo,” “freak,” “lesbian,” “femme boy,” “gay
boy,” “bitch,” “queer,” “pansy,” and “queen.”3 In addition to being
kicked and pushed down repeatedly, Jesse was subjected to threats and
assaults “of a more sexual nature”: 4
[A] student in his middle school choir class grabbed his legs, inner
thighs, chest and crotch. He states that the same student grabbed his
buttocks on at least five or six occasions. Later another student
approached him and asked to see him naked after gym class.

1.
2000).
2.
3.
4.

Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1084-85 (D. Minn.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id.
425
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Plaintiff states that he experienced similar incidents when he was in
high school. According to plaintiff, students in his ninth and tenth
grade choir classes sometimes put their arms around him or grabbed
his inner thighs and buttocks while calling him names targeted at his
perceived sexual orientation. Plaintiff states that one of the students
grabbed his own genitals while squeezing plaintiff’s buttocks, and on
other occasions would stand behind plaintiff and grind his penis into
plaintiff’s backside. The same student once threw him to the ground
and pretended to rape him anally, and on another occasion sat on
plaintiff’s lap and bounced while pretending to have intercourse with
5
him. Other students watched and laughed during these incidents.

When he brought an action against the school under Title IX, the
court dismissed his claims because “Title IX prohibits only
discrimination based on sex and does not extend to any other form of
invidious discrimination.” 6 Therefore, the court concluded, “[T]o the
extent that plaintiff asserts Title IX claims based on discrimination due
to his sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation, these claims are
not actionable and must be dismissed.” 7
In a case detailing hazing on a high school football team, however,
allegations of behavior strikingly similar to that in Montgomery were
considered sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss under Title IX. 8
The court does not suggest the harassment was inspired by antihomosexual animus, nor that the victim, John Roe, was gay or perceived
to be gay. 9 Under those facts, the court explained that “[a]lthough Title
IX was not intended and does not function to protect students from
bullying generally, the homophobic language used by the perpetrators
appears to be part of a larger constellation of sexually-based conduct,
which included assaulting Plaintiff [anally] with an air hose, exposing
their genitalia, and grabbing his bare buttocks in the shower. Drawing
the inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, there remains a factual dispute on the
issue of whether ‘the conduct at issue relate[s] to gender.’” 10
In other words, because John Roe was subjected to sexually
charged abuse, his hazing could be interpreted to “relate to gender” and
thereby satisfy Title IX’s requirement that the conduct be sex based.
Nearly identical sexual abuse directed at Jesse Montgomery, however,
could not be interpreted to be based on sex because the abuse was
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id. at 1090.
Id.
Roe v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Cal. 2009).
Id. at 1027
Id.
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inspired by his perceived sexual attraction to other boys.
It is beyond ironic that anti-gay animus can purge the sex-based
taint from conduct that would be sex-based were it directed at a
heterosexual student. Nevertheless, that interpretation is the one most
courts have embraced.
The majority of courts have concluded that Congress did not intend
to prohibit harassment based upon sexual orientation; 11 so when a child
is bullied and abused because she is gay or perceived to be gay,
Congress apparently intended to let the school look the other way and
leave her to the mercy of brutal peers. If, on the other hand, her
heterosexual female classmate is harassed in precisely the same manner,
the same Congress intended to protect her from such abuse because she
is being harassed on the basis of sex.
This special treatment for gay students under Title IX runs afoul of
our most basic notions of fairness and justice. LGBT students are
already accorded ugly forms of special treatment in most school settings:
they are bullied at two to three times the rate of their heterosexual peers
and bullied more severely, and their plights are virtually ignored by
administrators and teachers. 12 The last thing LGBT students need is an
interpretation of Title IX that denies them protection and remedies when
schools ignore a hostile environment in which gays are mere sexual
objects to be preyed upon and abused.

11. Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385,
406-07 (2012). As Professor Waldman explains,
[i]nitially, courts followed Title VII jurisprudence to analyze Title IX cases and
found Title IX unavailable to gay students alleging discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation. Despite Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, a seminal Title
VII case in which the Supreme Court found that sexual harassment was still
actionable even if the aggressor and victim were of the same sex, discrimination
based on sexual orientation is still often unavailable to Title IX plaintiffs . . . . So, if
sexual orientation claims are unlikely under Title IX, victims of antigay bullying are
left to prove discrimination on the basis of gender or sex.
Id.
12. See Markus P. Bidell, School Counselors and Social Justice Advocacy for Lesbian,
Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Questioning Students. 9 J. OF SCH. COUNSELING 4-5
(2011). The Gay, Lesbian, and Straight Education Network (GLSEN) conducted a nationwide
survey of over 7,000 LGBT students in 2009. Almost 75% of the surveyed students heard
remarks or names such as “fag, dyke, queer, and faggot,” while at school, and almost 61% felt
unsafe at school. Further, about 85% were verbally harassed and nearly half were physically
assaulted due to their sexual orientation or gender identity. GLSEN’s study also revealed that
over half of the surveyed students experienced cyberbullying, irrespective of their sexual
orientation or gender identity. Middle school students experienced more “LGBTQ-motivated
verbal and physical harassment as well as physical assault” when compared to surveyed high
school students. Id.
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SEXUAL OBJECTIFICATION

Harassment based upon sexual orientation, after all, reduces the
target to a sexual being and nothing more. 13 The target is treated only in
terms of her sexuality; the remainder of her personhood is ignored or
denigrated. She is perceived in purely sexual terms and punished on the
basis of that perception.
The District Court for the Northern District of California made that
very point as early as 2000:
[T]he Court finds no material difference between the instance in
which a female student is subject to unwelcome sexual comments
and advances due to her harasser’s perception that she is a sexual
object, and the instance in which a male student is insulted and
abused due to his harasser’s perception that he is a homosexual, and
therefore a subject of prey. In both instances, the conduct is a
heinous response to the harasser’s perception of the victim’s
14
sexuality, and is not distinguishable to this Court.

Judge James captured the logic perfectly. Sexually charged abuse
motivated by animus toward the target’s sexuality is harassment based
on sex, regardless of the orientation of that sexuality. Because
harassment based upon sexual orientation frames the target as a sexual
object, Title IX should be interpreted to prohibit that harassment in
exactly the same way it prohibits any sexual harassment. Otherwise,
LGBT students are abused not only by their peers, teachers, and school
administrators; they are deprived of protection and remedy by a deeply
illogical and unjust interpretation of the very statute that should protect
them.
II. THE TITLE VII FALLACY
The notion that Title IX does not apply to anti-gay harassment is
rooted in interpretations of Title VII, 15 which is viewed as the guide for
interpreting Title IX. 16 According to those interpretations, the term
“sex” was intended to encompass “traditional notions of sex,” and

13. Martha Nussbaum, Carr, Before and After: Power and Sex in Carr v. Allison Gas
Turbine Division, General Motors Corp, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1831, 1833 (2007) (“‘Sexual’
harassment is . . . harassment in which the content concerns sexual relations, in which the
woman is being treated as a sexual object, a person available for sexual overtures and likely
sexual favors, in a way that is either extortionate . . . or intimidating . . . or both.”).
14. Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1170 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
15. See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2 (2006).
16. Id.
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alternative sexual orientations do not fit those traditional notions. 17 In
addition, multiple attempts to amend Title VII to include sexual
orientation have failed; therefore, the interpretation must be consistent
with congressional intent. 18
This approach to the statute contains several logical flaws. First,
nothing in the legislative history of Title VII requires such an approach;
in fact, little legislative history exists at all because the language was
inserted into Title VII as a failed attempt, on the day before the final
vote, to defeat the Civil Rights Act, which was targeting racial
discrimination. 19 The Act passed with the prohibition on sex-based
discrimination intact.20 Given the nature of the incorporation of the
language into the statute, no legislative history exists to indicate
congressional intent. 21
Despite that dearth of legislative history, the Supreme Court has
been perfectly comfortable inferring a congressional intent to protect
workers against sexual harassment 22 and harassment based upon the
target’s failure to conform to gender stereotypes,23 and those
interpretations have been applied to Title IX. 24 Congress, of course,
17. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977)
(explaining that “[g]iving the statute its plain meaning, this court concludes that Congress had
only the traditional notions of ‘sex’ in mind. Later legislative activity makes this narrow
definition even more evident. Several bills have been introduced to amend the Civil Rights
Act to prohibit discrimination against ‘sexual preference.’ None have been enacted into
law.”).
18. Id.
19. Katie Manley, The BFOQ Defense: Title VII’s Concession to Gender
Discrimination, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 169, 171 (2009).
In a last minute attempt to defeat the legislation, a House Representative who
opposed the bill proposed that the bill be broadened to include sex in the list of
protected categories. The House Judiciary Committee did not hold a hearing on the
amendment to add gender discrimination to Title VII and little discussion of the
addition ensued. This effort to thwart the passage of Title VII was unsuccessful, and
the bill passed with the inclusion of sex as a protected category. As a result, the
legislative history of the sex discrimination portion of Title VII and the BFOQ
defense is nearly nonexistent.
Id.
20. Id.
21. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the lack of legislative history demonstrates that
the dearth of legislative history is precisely why “based on sex” should be limited to a
traditional meaning: “The total lack of legislative history supporting the sex amendment
coupled with the circumstances of the amendment’s adoption clearly indicates that Congress
never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation apply to anything other than the
traditional concept of sex.” Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984).
22. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986).
23. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952,
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never actually considered either type of abuse when it enacted Title VII
in 1964 or Title IX in 1972. The hostile environment theory was not
even recognized by the Supreme Court until twenty-two years after the
Civil Rights Act in Meritor Savings, 25 a 1986 Title VII case; and the
theory did not make it into the Court’s Title IX jurisprudence until ten
years later in Franklin in 1996. 26 The theory would not be extended to
peer-on-peer student harassment until Davis v. Monroe in 1999. 27 Even
so, the Court has been comfortable finding such intent in the original
enactment of Title VII and Title IX. 28
III. THE FAILURE TO CONFORM TO GENDER STEREOTYPES
A much more obvious and serious logical fallacy occurs in
courts’ contortions to find discrimination on the basis of failure to meet
gender stereotypes while denying that Title VII and Title IX apply to
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.29 Splitting sexual
973 (D. Kan. 2005) (holding that gender stereotyping applies to student-on-student
harassment under Title IX).
25. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66-67 (“[C]ourts have uniformly held, and we agree, that a
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment.”).
26. Franklin v. Gwinnett Cnty. Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
Unquestionably, Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the duty
not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and “when a supervisor sexually harasses a
subordinate because of the subordinate’s sex, that supervisor ‘discriminate[s]’ on
the basis of sex.” We believe the same rule should apply when a teacher sexually
harasses and abuses a student. Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to
be expended to support the intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe.
Id. (quoting Vinson, 477 U.S. at 64).
27. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 631 (1999) (concluding “that
student-on-student sexual harassment, if sufficiently severe, can likewise rise to the level of
‘discrimination’ actionable under the statute”).
28. See, e.g., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79-80 (1998).
[S]tatutory prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the
principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed. Title VII prohibits
“discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex” in the ‘terms’ or “conditions” of
employment. Our holding that this includes sexual harassment must extend to
sexual harassment of any kind that meets the statutory requirements.
Id.
29. Ann C. Mcginley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and
Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 744 (2010). As Professor
McGinley explains,
[i]t is possible, as a theoretical matter, to distinguish between discrimination based
on sexual orientation and discrimination based on gender identity and expression . . .
. The cases demonstrate that it is nearly impossible to distinguish between sexual
stereotyping discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination because the means
used to discriminate or harass are virtually identical, and even the harassers are
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orientation from failure to conform to gender expectations ignores the
fact that girls are expected to be sexually attracted to boys and vice
versa, that heterosexual attraction is assumed by virtually everyone at a
child’s birth. If instead the child later identifies as gay, she will
unquestionably be living in a manner contrary to society’s general
assumptions about men and women. Therefore, nothing could be more
contrary to stereotypical notions of gender than sexual desire for one’s
own sex. 30
If Title IX prohibits discrimination based upon failure to fulfill
gender expectations, its prohibition must logically extend to harassment
for failure to fulfill the expectation of heterosexual orientation. Courts,
however, routinely accept the notion that somehow sexual orientation is
not a part of gender expectations. That notion requires intellectual and
semantic acrobatics only a law professor could love.
The gender stereotype theory found its genesis in the Supreme
Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, in which a female employee was
denied a promotion because she did not satisfy management’s notions of
femininity. 31 Although Amy Hopkins was praised for her integrity,
creativity, and hard work, she was denied a promotion to partner in part
because she could be “abrasive” and “macho” in her dealings with other
employees. 32 Hopkins was advised that she should dress in a more
feminine manner and take a charm school course in order to be more
likely unaware of their exact motivations.
Id.
30. William C. Sung, Taking the Fight Back to Title VII: A Case for Redefining
“Because of Sex” to Include Gender Stereotypes, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity, 84
S. CAL. L. REV. 487, 536-37 (2011) (The Sixth Circuit, in Vickers v. Fairfield Medical
Center, “announced that ‘all homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender
norms in their sexual practices’ and therefore, ‘recognition of [the plaintiff’s] claim would
have the effect of de facto amending Title VII to encompass sexual orientation as a prohibited
basis for discrimination.’”).
[M]en are socially expected to be physically attracted to women, and women to
men. But gay men and lesbian women, because of their gender nonconforming
affectional choices, do not conform to the stereotypical norms of how men and
women should associate themselves intimately. And discrimination or harassment
based on their gender nonconforming behavior is impermissible irrespective of the
cause of the behavior, whether it be gender expression or affectional preferences . . .
. Although discrimination or harassment against gay men and lesbian women’s
nonconforming affectional preference is a natural extension of discrimination on the
basis of gender stereotypes, courts have sidestepped the issue either by
recharacterizing claims or by limiting the gender-stereotyping framework to
effeminate men and masculine women, regardless of their sexual orientations.
Id.
31. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
32. Id. at 235.
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“ladylike.” 33 The Court concluded that Price Waterhouse management
had impermissibly based its decision upon stereotypical notions of
femininity in violation of Title VII. 34
Courts latched onto the Price Waterhouse logic to conclude that
when, for example, males were harassed for behaving in a “feminine”
manner, they were being singled out for harassment because of sex in
the same way Amy Hopkins had been punished for not conforming to
stereotypical gender expectations.
The Eighth Circuit’s explanation in Schmedding 35 is typical of the
courts’ use of the Price Waterhouse logic to get at harassment with a
sexual orientation component. The Eighth Circuit begins by pointing
out that the complaint referred to the plaintiff having been taunted for
being perceived to be homosexual and that such allegations could be
confusing to the district court because they suggest the harassment was
based upon the plaintiff’s sexual orientation.36 The plaintiff, however,
successfully countered that the point of the allegations was not that the
perceived homosexuality inspired the harassment but that the anti-gay
comments were designed to denigrate his masculinity. 37 The court
concluded that
[a]lthough Schmedding’s use of the phrase “perceived sexual
preference” may have been somewhat misleading . . . in light of the
confusion over the meaning of that phrase, and Schmedding’s
willingness to amend the complaint so as to delete it, the best
recourse is to remand the case to the district court with instructions
that plaintiff be allowed to amend his complaint and proceed with
38
the case.

In other words, Schmedding’s lawyer fell into a pleading trap: by
truthfully describing the motivation for the harassment as hostility to
Schmedding’s perceived sexual orientation, the complaint very nearly
failed under Title IX. 39 Some fast-talking about “confusing” phrasing

33. Id. at 256.
34. Id. at 258.
35. Schmedding v. Tnemec Co., 187 F.3d 862, 864-65 (8th Cir. 1999).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 865.
39. Id. See also Courtney Weiner, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment
As Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 212
(2005) (noting that dismissing claims of sexual orientation discrimination because the
complaint did not plead discrimination on the basis of gender stereotyping “highlight[s] both
the pleading traps created by disaggregating the two concepts and the gap in the law created
by lack of coverage for sexual orientation. Neither court reached the merits of the sex-
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and “an effort to debase [Schmedding’s] masculinity” through false
accusations of homosexuality saved the day. 40 So long as the
harassment could be characterized, however implausibly, as based on
something other than sexual orientation, the complaint could survive.
Schmedding’s lawyer, of course, had to amend the complaint to remove
the confusion.
Rather than aiding in the search for the truth, this sort of legal
fiction obscures reality in order to align the pleadings and the fact
finding with a bizarre notion of gender stereotyping. 41 It demands that
everyone in the litigation suspend disbelief and pretend that effeminate
behavior in men is about gender, but homosexual orientation is not. The
court’s logic ignores the elephant in the room and forces the plaintiff to
do the same if he wishes to proceed with his case.
This same legal fiction has bled into Title IX jurisprudence and
forces plaintiffs to engage in the same double talk to find a remedy when
school officials have allowed other students to torment those plaintiffs
because of their sexual orientation. In Montgomery, for example, the
court reasoned that “to the extent that plaintiff asserts Title IX claims
based on discrimination due to his sexual orientation or perceived sexual
orientation, [the] claims are not actionable and must be dismissed.” 42
The court, however, “[found] important” the fact that plaintiff’s peers
had begun harassing him as early as kindergarten.43

stereotyping claim because the plaintiffs had failed to include it in their original arguments.”).
40. Schmedding, 187 F.3d at 865.
41. Hamm v. Weyauwega Milk Products, Inc., 332 F.3d 1058, 1067 (7th Cir. 2003)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (noting the absurdity of the fiction stating: “[t]o impute such a
distinction to the authors of Title VII is to indulge in a most extravagant legal fiction. It is
also to saddle the courts with the making of distinctions that are beyond the practical capacity
of the litigation process. Hostility to effeminate men and to homosexual men, or to masculine
women and to lesbians, will often be indistinguishable as a practical matter, especially the
former. Effeminate men often are disliked by other men because they are suspected of being
homosexual (though the opposite is also true-effeminate homosexual men may be disliked by
heterosexual men because they are effeminate rather than because they are homosexual),
while mannish women are disliked by some men because they are suspected of being lesbians
and by other men merely because they are not attractive to those men; a further complication
is that men are more hostile to male homosexuality than they are to lesbianism. To suppose
courts capable of disentangling the motives for disliking the nonstereotypical man or woman
is a fantasy.”).
42. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Minn.
2000).
43. Id. The court reasoned that “it is highly unlikely that at that tender age plaintiff
would have developed any solidified sexual preference, or for that matter, that he even
understood what it meant to be ‘homosexual’ or ‘heterosexual.’” Id. Rather, the court found
it “much more plausible that the students began tormenting him based on feminine personality
traits that he exhibited and the perception that he did not engage in behaviors befitting a boy.”
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As in Schmedding, the Montgomery court was forced to find a way
around the elephant in the room in order to find a viable cause of action.
The harassment in each case was fueled by animus toward homosexual
orientations, but the harassment had to be artificially characterized
otherwise, although nothing about the acts had changed at all. Perhaps,
in fact, it would be more accurate to say neither court finds a way around
the elephant; each paints it a new color and calls it a different animal.
The argument could be made, of course, that had the plaintiffs
been “men’s men” the distinction would hold water. The problem with
that reasoning is that it requires the belief that a homosexual orientation
is consistent with stereotypical notions of masculinity. It requires the
belief that exhibiting effeminate characteristics is not what men are
expected to do, but that having sex with other men is what “real men”
are expected to do, as imagined by society. If that were true, James
Bond would seduce male agents and leave them gazing lovingly at him
as he disappears out the door to dispatch an international villain.
Sexual orientation harassment should have been swept into Title
VII and Title IX prohibitions as an unavoidable consequence of the
Price Waterhouse decision. The Price Waterhouse Court concluded
that, while Congress had never considered the question that Amy
Hopkins’s case raised, Congress intended discrimination based on sex to
have a broad enough meaning to cover gender stereotyping. 44 Once the
Court accepted that premise, the question about sexual orientation was
answered. Congress undoubtedly did not consider the question of sexual
orientation when passing either Title VII or Title IX, but a proscription
against harassment based upon sexual orientation is at least as plausible
as an implied prohibition against harassment based upon a failure to
conform to gender stereotypes.
None of this is to say that the gender stereotyping theory has no
place. Under the right facts, it makes perfect sense. In Theno, for
example, Dylan Theno’s abusers did not believe he was gay, even
though they sometimes used anti-gay epithets against him. 45 The court
rightly concluded that “plaintiff was harassed because he failed to satisfy
his peers’ stereotyped expectations for his gender because the primary
objective of plaintiff’s harassers appears to have been to disparage his

Id. For these reasons, the court concluded that plaintiff’s complaint “plead facts that would
support a claim of harassment based on the perception that he did not fit his peers’ stereotypes
of masculinity.” Id.
44. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-42 (1989).
45. Theno v. Tonganoxie Unified Sch. Dist. No. 464, 377 F. Supp. 2d 952, 964 (D.
Kan. 2005).
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perceived lack of masculinity.” 46
The court’s logic is unassailable under these facts; it recognizes
Dylan Theno’s punishment by his peers for his failing to conform to
gender stereotypes just as Amy Hopkins was punished for an alleged
lack of femininity. Title IX should be interpreted to apply in such a
case, because the harassment is unquestionably about sex. The point,
however, is that harassment based upon an anti-gay animus is as much
about gender stereotyping as is harassment based upon a rumor about
masturbation. Strikingly, in fact, the Theno court compares the
accusations of masturbation to labeling a child as a homosexual.47 In
both cases, the harassment is based upon the child’s failure “to meet his
peers’ stereotyped expectations of masculinity.”
Every child in the country knows that calling an adolescent boy a
faggot is perhaps the most effective and popular way to call his manhood
into question. Only courts seem unclear on the notion. As the reasoning
in Theno reveals, of course, the courts know it as well as the children.
Once the statute was interpreted broadly to include causes of action
no one in Congress would have imagined in 1964 or 1972, nothing in the
language of the statute requires that it be interpreted to exclude
harassment based upon sexual orientation. Nevertheless, courts have
held fast to that exclusion, even in the face of Oncale, which swept
same-sex harassment into Title VII’s prohibitions. 48 To justify that
exclusion, courts point to Congress’s failure to amend Title VII to
explicitly include sexual orientation.49
IV. FAILURE TO AMEND TITLE VII
The failed attempts to add sexual orientation to Title VII should
not be the indicator of congressional intent because it is the intent of the
Congress that enacted the statutes that is at issue, and nothing indicates a
positive intent to exclude anti-gay discrimination. The view of a future
46. Id. at 965 (citations omitted). The court also concluded that plaintiff’s harassers’
crude drawings depicting him as a masturbator, “when combined with arguably related crude
name-calling, reflects that plaintiff’s harassers believed that he did not conform to male
stereotypes by not engaging in such behavior at school, i.e., that he did not act as a man
should act.” Id. at 972. Based on these findings, the court held that the plaintiff had raised a
genuine issue of material fact about whether his harassment was based on sex. Id.
47. Id. at 972.
48. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
49. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 2000). (“Although
congressional inaction subsequent to the enactment of a statute is not always a helpful guide,
Congress’s refusal to expand the reach of Title VII is strong evidence of congressional intent
in the face of consistent judicial decisions refusing to interpret ‘sex’ to include sexual
orientation.”). Id. (citations omitted).
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Congress is relevant only if it takes positive action to amend the statute,
not if it fails to do so. 50
The failure to amend may leave the interpretation intact; but until
the Supreme Court speaks, the lower courts are not bound to perpetuate
that interpretation and should not require Congress to prove that it does
not wish to leave gays unprotected while their heterosexual peers are
protected against precisely the same acts.
V. ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE 1972 CONGRESS
In addition, it is perverse to imagine that a Congress intending to
protect children against sex discrimination in educational programs
would have reached such patently cruel and inconsistent conclusions.
The nation may have been largely unwilling to approve of
homosexuality in 1972, but it seems unlikely that the typical member of
Congress would have deliberately decided to protect heterosexual
students from harassment and abuse and, at the same time, refused to
prevent that abuse of students who were gay. In other words, it is
unlikely that members of Congress would have believed any child
should go to school to be beaten and abused by his peers. Some
members may have been so callous, but assuming a majority of
legislators would countenance such cruelty attributes that callousness to
the likes of Edward Kennedy, Shirley Chisholm, and George McGovern.
It requires the assumption that Congress would deliberately decide that if
a child could demonstrate he was being harassed because he failed to
conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity, he could demonstrate
that he was suffering discrimination on the basis of sex. If he could
demonstrate only that he was being harassed because he was gay, he
could find no remedy under Title IX.
Let’s review that logic. Step 1: a boy who is behaving in an
effeminate manner is failing to conform to stereotypical notions of
masculinity. Step 2: a boy who is engaging in sexual acts with another

50. Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 209, 243-44 (2012). Professor Schwartz enumerates the problems of inferring
legislative intent based on legislative inaction as follows:
First, Congress is a discontinuous decision maker, and the intent that should be
relevant (if any) is the intent of the Congress that actually enacted the legislation.
Second, Congress is a collective decision maker, making it very difficult to
determine exactly what the intent of Congress is when it fails to do something.
Third, the structure of Congress makes if far more likely that something will not
happen than that it will, making it hard to infer affirmative intent from Congress’s
failure to pass a proposed statute.
Id.

WEDDLE FINAL 52813

2013]

7/13/2013 1:03 PM

YOU’D BE OK IF YOU WEREN’T SO GAY

437

boy is not failing to conform to stereotypical notions of masculinity.
Step 3: Congress intended to protect the first boy from persecution
because no child should be picked on for being effeminate. Step 4:
Congress did not intend to protect the second boy because any boy who
identifies as gay deserves what he gets. Step 5: Congress never actually
thought those thoughts; but given the opportunity, it would have.
The logic ignores another inescapable contradiction. Anyone
who would have allowed a child to be harassed for being gay would also
have allowed the child to be harassed for being effeminate. Anyone who
would act to stop a child from being abused because he was effeminate
would act to stop the same abuse if it were based upon his being gay.
Therefore, once the Court decided that a majority of Congress would not
tolerate harassment for effeminate characteristics, it effectively said that
the same majority would not tolerate harassment for being gay.
VI. GENDER-BASED NATURE OF HARASSMENT BASED ON SEXUAL
ORIENTATION
It is inescapable that harassment on the basis of sexual orientation
is inextricably tied to gender. In other words, discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is actually relational discrimination, a theory of
discrimination that has long been accepted in Title VII jurisprudence in
the context of race and national origin.51
Similarly, in the context of sexual orientation, when a female is
bullied because she is a lesbian, she is being targeted because of “her sex
(female) in relation to her sexual relationships with others (female).
Therefore, her claim for discrimination on the basis of her sexual
orientation is necessarily a claim that she is being discriminated against
on the basis of her sex when viewed in relation to others.” 52 A
structurally consistent interpretation of Title VII would compel applying
the relational discrimination theory to the interpretation of “sex,” given
that “‘sex’ is listed as parallel to these characteristics in Title VII’s
51. Id. at 211. Professor Schwartz explains that relational discrimination cases interpret
“Title VII’s otherwise ambiguous language protecting against discrimination ‘because of such
individual’s [protected characteristic]’ as a robust phrase that takes into account human
interactions and relationships, as opposed to a narrow understanding limited to an individual’s
protected characteristic viewed in isolation.” Id. In the context of race and national origin,
relational discrimination occurs “any time an employer discriminates against an individual
because of his or her interracial relationship; that employer is necessarily considering the race
of the individual employee, viewed relationally to the other person in the relationship, in
making that determination.” Id.
52. Id. at 248.
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relevant statutory language, which prohibits discrimination ‘because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.’” 53
In the same way, Title IX’s language, “based on sex,” should be
understood from the standpoint of relational discrimination. When a girl
is bullied because she is a lesbian, she being bullied because her
relationships with other members of her gender are unacceptable, in the
same way a white student’s relationship with a black student might be
unacceptable and a cause for harassment.54 No one would doubt the
harassment directed at the latter couple was harassment based on race,
because the animus is directed at the child’s willingness to engage in an
interracial relationship, a relationship the harasser believes is contrary to
proper racial behavior; nor should anyone doubt that harassment of a
lesbian couple is harassment based on sex, because the animus is
directed at the girl’s willingness to engage in a same-gender relationship,
a relationship the harasser believes is contrary to proper behavior by the
female gender. 55
In addition, harassment based upon sexual orientation is also
inevitably based upon gender because in the real world harassment based
upon sexual orientation is virtually always harassment based upon
LGBT orientation. While heterosexual students are certainly sexually
harassed, they are seldom harassed for being heterosexual. Only when a
student is not heterosexual is she vulnerable to harassment because of
her sexual orientation. Therefore, it would be more accurate to refer to
such harassment as what it is—harassment on the basis of a sexual
orientation that is inconsistent with the target’s gender. 56
Many would object that a homosexual orientation is not
inconsistent with a person’s gender, but the reality is that most consider
it to be so, and therein lies the motivation for harassment. Most people
believe that each gender should be attracted to the other; were that not
the case, harassment based upon sexual orientation would not exist.
When a person identifies as LGBT, that person has defied accepted
gender roles, and any harassment based upon that defiance is premised
on the person’s gender and the expected sexual orientation of that
gender.
Under both Price Waterhouse’s gender stereotype theory and
Ray’s sexual object theory, harassment based upon sexual orientation is
harassment based upon gender. But for the target’s gender, the
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 247.
Id. at 249.
See id.
Id. at 248.
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harassment would not have occurred; the harassment is, therefore,
entirely about gender, whether it is directed at a person who fails to
conform to gender expectations or at a person who is being defined
entirely in terms of her sexuality because that sexuality diverges from
what is typical of the person’s gender. Viewing it otherwise requires
ignoring what everyone understands to be true not only about how
society views alternative sexual orientations, but also about why those
orientations are targeted for harassment.
CONCLUSION
The legal fiction that has driven Title IX jurisprudence regarding
harassment based on sexual orientation is more than simply illogical and
blind: it is cruel. Its effects are real for children who are subject to
brutalization by their peers and abandonment by their elders. Whatever
the niceties of statutory interpretations that exclude protection for these
children, those niceties cannot justify the perverse choice that compels
adults to pretend sexual orientation is not about sex while every
adolescent bully and every LGBT target know better.
Federal courts should boldly and unapologetically slap that
fiction down. If Congress disagrees, let it say so plainly; let it proclaim
before the nation’s voters that LGBT school children deserve no
protection from peer-on-peer abuse in the nation’s schools. Until then,
the courts should assume that Congress has always been made up of
adults who know at least as much about sex as the nation’s children. If
Congress turns out to be less informed than adolescents and no more
compassionate than the worst of school yard bullies, courts can be
forgiven for having expected better from the nation’s elected leaders.

